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Abstract. Model checking of real-time systems against Duration Calculus (DC) specifications requires the trans-
lation of DC formulae into automata-based semantics. The existing algorithms provide a limited DC coverage
and do not support compositional verification.We propose a translation algorithm that advances the applicability
of model checking tools to realistic applications. Our algorithm significantly extends the subset of DC that can
be checked automatically. The central part of the algorithm is the automatic decomposition of DC specifications
into sub-properties that can be verified independently. The decomposition is based on a novel distributive law for
DC. We implemented the algorithm in a tool chain for the automated verification of systems comprising data,
communication, and real-time aspects. We applied the tool chain to verify safety properties in an industrial case
study from the European Train Control System (ETCS).
Keywords: Model checking; Verification; Duration Calculus; Timed automata; Real-time systems;
European Train Control System; Case study
1. Introduction
Verification of embedded hardware and software systems requires reasoning about data, communication, and
real-time aspects. All three dimensions can be expressed by the Duration Calculus (DC) [ZH04]. This logic
supports reasoning about variables that are interpreted over dense real-time intervals. Extensions of DC take
infinite data types and communication events into account.
A prominent approach to the verification of temporal specifications consists of translating the problem into an
automata-theoretic setting and then applying graph-based algorithms [VW86]. To apply this approach for model
checking DC, we need an algorithm that converts DC formulae into automata. This is a difficult task and it has
been shown in [ZHS93] that it cannot be solved in general. Translation algorithms into automata-based semantics
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are only known for restricted classes of DC [Rav94, BLR95, Pan02, Fra¨04, FH07]. These algorithms are either
not compositional or forbid the use of negation. They do not consider infinite data domains and communication
aspects. Support of parameterisedmodels andDCspecifications aswell as variables overunboundeddatadomains
is crucial for the applicability of the algorithm in our target domain of train control systems.Moreover, the existing
translations suffer from an exponential blow-up of the resulting automata in the number of DC operators, which
hinders the applicability of verification tools.
In this article, we identify a new class of DC formulae, called test formulae, that can be translated into timed
automata, also referred to as test automata. Test formulae significantly extend the previously known classes (by
strictly subsuming them or being incomparable). They take communication aspects and infinite data domains
into account. Furthermore, we identify a normal form representation of test formulae that provides a basis
for the compositional verification. Our normal form decomposes a formula into disjuncts that are translated
independently. This allows for an efficient verification as it reduces the size of the automata. The normal form is
realised with a new operator for the DC that permits a distributive law of linear complexity. The translation yields
a characterisation of the model checking problem in terms of reachability. The reachability problem is decidable
under a dense time interpretation for models with finite data domains.
We implemented our translation algorithm in a tool chain that verifies real-time models against properties
specified using our class of test formulae.We successfully applied our tool chain to large-scale real-world problems
and verified the emergency procedure of the European Train Control System (ETCS) [ERT02]. Our approach is
the first that permits model checking of a comprehensive ETCS fragment considering communication, infinite
data, and real-time. In our case study, we applied the abstraction refinementmodel checker ARMC [PR07], which
supports parameters and infinite data types.
To summarise our contributions,we identify a novel class ofDC formulae and give a translation algorithm into
enhanced timed automata [AD94]. Since a direct translation leads to an exponential blow-up of the automata,
we give a normal form for our novel class to decompose given properties. We demonstrate the applicability of
our approach by verifying a case study of the European Train Control System.
This paper is an extended version of [MFR06]. It differs from the preliminary paper in the following aspects.
We give the full and constructive proof for the normal form. We explain the translation from test formulae into
a timed automata-based representation in detail and give hints for the correctness proof. This construction is
also published in [Hoe06], but the presentation has been improved significantly. We prove the correctness of the
overall model checking procedure. We provide our case study’s full ETCS model that has only been sketched in
the previous paper and a detailed explanation of the verification undertaken.
The paper is organised as follows. After a short introduction to our case study, we introduce the DC and the
applied automaton model, Phase Event Automata (PEA), in Sect. 2. The class of test formulae, the new operator,
and the normal form are presented in Sect. 3. Based upon these results, Sect. 4 gives the test automata semantics
and proves the correctness of ourmodel checking approach. Themodel of our case study and ourmodel checking
results are presented in Sect. 5. Section 6, reviewing related work and suggesting future investigations, concludes
the paper.
1.1. Application domain: train control systems
The emerging ETCS is an international standard [ERT02] that shall replace national train control systems to
ensure cross-border interoperability and improve railway safety as well as track utilisation. In the final ETCS
implementation level, the existing national track side systems for detection of train speed, location, and integrity
will not be used anymore. Instead, a radio block centre (RBC) controls the traffic in a well-defined area. It
ascertains in cooperation with the ETCS units installed in the trains their speed and position values. RBCs and
trains communicate over a GSM-R radio connection. To increase the possible traffic density, the ETCS employs
a moving block principle, by which the RBC grants to a train the authorisation to move up to a position closely
behind the preceding train (cf. Fig. 1). In our case study, we analyse the emergency handling: in case of an unusual
event or a mishap, the train control system has to stop all trains safely. The desired property in our case study is
that the trains will never collide.
Verification approaches for safety requirements of industrial systems like the ETCS have to consider the
identified dimensions: data, communication, and real-time. In this paper, we present the first verification of an
ETCS fragment where all these aspects are considered.
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Fig. 1. Consecutive trains
2. Preliminaries
Since we translate DC formulae into Phase Event Automata (PEA), we review DC and PEA in this section.
2.1. Duration Calculus
Duration Calculus [ZH04] is an interval-based logic for the specification of real-time systems. We use dense real-
time, Time : R≥0. To represent a system state at a point in time, DC uses state expressions. State expressions,
denoted by ϕ, are quantifier-free first-order formulae over time-dependent variables, so-called observables (X ∈)
SV ar . For every observable X there is a data domain D(X ). The semantics of an observable X is given by an
interpretation I assigning a mapping I(X ) : Time → D(X ) to the observable. Additionally, there are predicates
p/n of arity n ∈ N with interpretations pˆ : D(X1) × . . . × D(Xn) → B.
The semantics of a state expression ϕ depends on the semantics of the observables. Given an interpretation I
of the observables in ϕ, the semantics of ϕ is given by the mapping I[[ϕ]] : Time → {0, 1} as follows:
I[[p(X1, . . . ,Xn)]](t) : 1 iff pˆ(I(X1)(t), . . . , I(Xn)(t))  tt (1)
I[[¬ϕ1]](t) : 1 − I[[ϕ1]](t)
I[[ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2]](t) : I[[ϕ1]](t) · I[[ϕ2]](t).
We require finite variability, i.e., for every predicate and every choice of observables the function in (1) has finitely
many discontinuities on every finite interval. This ensures I[[ϕ]] is (Riemann) integrable. The class of DC formulae
(F ∈) Form is defined by
Form :: ϕ |  ∼ k | ¬Form | Form1 ∧ Form2 | Form1 ; Form2 | ∃X : Form,
where ∼ ∈ {≤,<,,>,≥}, k ∈ R≥0. Given an interpretation I of the observables in state expressions, the
semantics of a DC formula F evaluates the formula on a given finite interval:
I, [b, e] | ϕ iff ∫ eb I[[ϕ]](t) dt  e − b and e > bI, [b, e] |  ∼ k iff (e − b) ∼ k
I, [b, e] | ¬F iff I, [b, e] | F
I, [b, e] | F1 ∧ F2 iff I, [b, e] | F1 and I, [b, e] | F2
I, [b, e] | F1 ; F2 iff there is m ∈ [b, e] such that I, [b,m] | F1 and I, [m, e] | F2
I, [b, e] | ∃X : F iff there is I ′ \X I such that I ′, [b, e] | F .
Two interpretations are equal up to X , I ′ \X I, iff they coincide on all observables except X .
An interpretation I satisfies a formula F from time zero, I |0 F , iff the formula holds on all intervals starting
from zero, i.e., ∀t ∈ R≥0 : I, [0, t] | F . Two formulae F1,F2 are satisfiability equivalent iff for any interpretation
I it holds:
∃t ∈ R≥0 : I, [0, t] | F1 ⇔ ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : I, [0, t′] | F2.
The definition of test formulae in Sect. 3 depends on the notion of events specifying changes in the values of
Boolean observables (cf. transition formulae defined in [ZH04]). Let E be a Boolean observable. An event  E is
valid in a point interval [t, t] iff the value of E changes at t. The formula   E holds in [t, t] iff the value of E does
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not change at t. For an interval the forbidden event formula  E holds iff the value of E is constant in the given
interval.
2.2. Phase Event Automata
Phase Event Automata (PEA) [HM05] are a class of timed automata [AD94] that describe the behaviour of state-
and event-based systems. They serve as a bridge between the Duration Calculus and the model checker ARMC.
A distinguished feature of PEA is their parallel composition that synchronises on both events and data variables.
The event and data variables (denoted by A and V , respectively) directly correspond to the observables in DC.
Furthermore, the automaton has the notion of clocks from timed automata. A clock is a special variable that is
automatically incremented as time passes and that is not a DC observable. Let L(V ) denote the set of first-order
formulae over variables in V .
Definition 2.1 (Phase Event Automaton) A Phase Event Automaton is a tupleA  (P,V ,A,C,E, s, I ,P0), where
• P is a finite set of locations with initial locations P0 ⊆ P,
• V ,A,C are finite sets of real-valued state variables, events, and real-valued clocks, respectively,
• E ⊆ P × L(V ∪ V ′ ∪ A ∪ C) × P(C) × P is a set of transitions,
• s : P → L(V ) associates with each location a predicate that holds while the location is visited, and
• I : P → L(C) associates with each location a clock invariant.
A tuple (p1, g,X , p2) ∈ E represents a transition from p1 to p2 with a guard g over (possibly primed) variables,
clocks, and events, and a set X of clocks that are reset. Primed variables v′ denote the post-state of v whereas
v always refers to the pre-state. In addition, we postulate the presence of a stuttering transition (p,
∧
e∈A ¬e ∧∧
v∈V v′  v, ∅, p) for every location p. It allows the automaton to take a transition that does not change the
current state.
The operational semantics of PEA is given by runs.
Definition 2.2 (Run of a PEA) A run of a PEA A is a (finite or infinite) sequence
〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0), (p1, β1, γ1, t1,Y1), . . . 〉,
with locations pi ∈ P, valuations of variables βi , clock valuations γi , durations ti > 0, and event sets Yi ⊆ A.
Furthermore, we demand p0 ∈ P0, γ0(c)  0 for all clocks c ∈ C, βi | s(pi), and γi + ti | I (pi). For all
transitions (pi, g,X , pi+1) we require βi, β ′i+1, γi + ti,Yi | g and γi+1  (γi + ti)[X : 0]. We denote the set of all
runs of A by Run(A).
The intuition is that the automaton starts in p0, the valuation of variables is given by β0, and the valuation of
clocks is given by γ0. It stays in the location pi for ti seconds. During this time, the variables inV must not change
their values that are given by βi and that satisfy the state invariant s(pi). The values of the clocks when pi is
entered are given by γi . They are incremented by ti when pi is left. At that time the clock invariant I (pi) holds.
With the transition from pi to pi+1 the events in Yi occur. When the transition is taken the guard g holds. Its
unprimed variables are evaluated by βi , the primed variables by βi+1, and the clocks by γi + ti . Furthermore, the
clock valuation γi+1 after the transition is computed from the valuation γi + ti by setting all clocks in X to zero.
PEA composed in parallel synchronise on common events and additionally on common variables. That is, a
variable that occurs in both automata may only be changed if both automata agree. Clocks may not be shared
between the automata. The automata can always step synchronously, because any automaton can always take its
stuttering transitions.
Definition 2.3 (Parallel composition) The parallel composition of PEAA1 andA2 withAl  (Pl ,Vl ,Al ,Cl ,El , sl ,
Il ,P0l ) with disjoint clock sets, C1 ∩ C2  ∅, is given by
A1 || A2 : (P1 × P2,V1 ∪ V2,A1 ∪ A2,C1 ∪ C2,E, s1 ∧ s2, I1 ∧ I2,P01 × P02),
where ((p1, p2), g1 ∧ g2,X1 ∪ X2, (p′1, p′2)) ∈ E iff (pl , gl ,Xl , p′l ) ∈ El for l  1, 2.
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The expressiveness of PEA crucially depends on the constraints over the state variables: transition guards like
x′  x + 1 directly allow for encoding counter machines into PEA. Thus, reachability is in general undecidable.
However, if the data domain is finite and all transition guards and state invariants are decidable the reachability
problem can be decided as follows. We compute the parallel product to get a single automaton. Then we build
the following timed automaton [AD94]. For each location p of the PEA and each valuation β that satisfies the
state invariant s(p) we create a location (p, β) of the timed automaton. Its invariant is the clock invariant I (p).
For each transition (p1, g ∧ gc,X , p2) in the PEA, where g accesses only state and event variables and gc only
clock variables, and for each pair of valuations β1 and β2 such that β1 ∪β ′2 | g we introduce a transition labelled
with gc and reset set X between the locations (p1, β1) and (p2, β2) of the timed automaton. Then a location in the
PEA is reachable if and only if one of its corresponding locations in the timed automaton is reachable. To decide
the latter the algorithm in [AD94] can be used.
3. Test formulae
In this section, we introduce a novel subclass of DC we call test formulae, denoted by Testform. For test formulae
we give an automata translation in Sect. 4. Applying the automata-theoretic approach [VW86], we can decide
whether a system satisfies a negated test formula. Thus, test formulae may be interpreted as undesired system
behaviour.
Test formulae extend the state of the art in DC model checking (cf. Sect. 6). In particular, our class contains
formulae closed under Boolean operations. Hence, our automata translation has to handle negatedDC formulae.
Also, the construction sheds light upon the relationship between DC and automata-theoretic models.
We briefly discuss the structure of test formulae. To specify system states, we define phase formulae (in Phase).
Phases may have a timing constraint restricting their duration ( ∼ k), an invariant that holds while a system
is in the phase (ϕ), and a set of events that are forbidden ( E). From phases we construct trace formulae (in
Trace) to specify system evolutions. Event specifications ( E and   E , respectively) constrain the state changes
of a system. Formulae in Form are Boolean combinations of traces. Therefore, our class permits the negation of
traces, i.e., the negation of complex formulae containing the chop operator. Test formulae in Testform combine
formulae inForm via disjunction, chop, and conjunction. This yields additional expressiveness, e.g., for specifying
timing issues.
Definition 3.1 (Testform) The class of test formulae Testform is defined inductively:
Phase ::  > 0 ∧  ∼ k | Phase ∧ ϕ | Phase ∧  E
Trace :: Phase |  E |   E | Trace1 ; Trace2
Form :: Trace | ¬Form | Form1 ∧ Form2
Testform :: Form | Testform1 ; Testform2 | Testform1 ∧ Testform2 | Testform1 ∨ Testform2,
where k ∈ R>0, ϕ is a state expression, E is a Boolean observable, and ∼ ∈ {∅,≤,<,>,≥}. When  > 0 is the
only time constraint, we use ∼  ∅. We demand the first element in a trace to be a phase.
For our case study, undesired behaviour is that the leading train sends an alert message, indicated by formula (2),
but for longer than 6.5 time units neither the leading nor the following train applies the brakes, (3) and (4). Test
formula (5) reflects the critical behaviour. Note that the required property is ¬TF :
Warn : true ; FrontTrain.send .Alert ; true ; RearTrain.receive.Warning (2)
NoBrake1 : RearTrain.applyEB ∧  > 6.5 (3)
NoBrake2 : FrontTrain.applyEB ∧  > 6.5 (4)
TF : Warn ; (NoBrake1 ∧ NoBrake2) ; true. (5)
We argue that a logic based approach to verification is superior to approaches where undesired behaviour is
expressed directly in terms of test automata. The benefit of DC is its conciseness. A negated trace comprising n
phases requires in the worst case an automaton exponential in n. Thus, even for simple behaviour the modelling
of test automata by hand is error-prone, a disadvantage the automated compilation overcomes.
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3.1. Sync events
For arbitrary DC formulae F ,G,H there is no distributive law between the chop operator and the conjunction,
i.e., F ; (G ∧ H) ⇔ (F ; G) ∧ (F ; H). To recover some form of distributive law, we introduce sync events S, i.e.,
distinguished events occurring only once. They can be used to uniquely identify a chop point. For sync events
the following distributivity holds:
F S (G ∧ H) ⇔ (F S G) ∧ (F S H). (6)
Definition 3.2 (Sync events) Let F , G be DC formulae, S a Boolean observable not contained in F nor G. Let I
be an interpretation, b, e ∈ R≥0, b ≤ e. The sync event F S G is defined as follows:
I, [b, e] | F S G :⇔ ∃t ∈ [b, e] : (I, [b, t] | F ) ∧ (I, [t, e] | G) ∧
(I, [t, t] | S) ∧ (∀t′ ∈ [0, t) ∪ (t,∞) : I, [t′, t′] | S ).
To introduce sync events to test formulae, Equivalence (7) in the following lemma allows the replacement of a
chop operator with a fresh sync event not used in one of the formulae. Furthermore, an efficient distributivity
between sync events and conjunctions is stated.
Lemma 3.3 (Sync event introduction and linear distributivity) Let S be a Boolean observable not contained in F ,
Fi , G, Gj . The following equivalences hold:





















By definition, events do not happen at time zero. Therefore, we require  > 0 in (7). Analogously, the phase before
a sync event has a duration greater zero in (8), i.e., true holds. The distributivity in Equivalence (8) results in
















The introductionof sync events transformsa time-triggered real-time systemspecificationusing chopped formulae
into an event-triggered specification with sync events replacing chops. Event-triggered system specifications allow
for canonical operational semantics using labelled transitions whereas time-triggered specifications need some
elaborate clock construction to represent the timing issues.
3.2. A normal form theorem for test formulae
The following normal form theorem shows that every test formula is equivalent with a disjunctive normal form
(DNF) over traces. It thus decomposes the model checking problem to checking disjuncts. We comment on how
this reduces the size of the test automata at the end of Sect. 4.




with Tij :: Trij Sij true | trueSij1 Trij Sij2 true, (10)
where Trij are traces or negated traces and Sijk are fresh Boolean observables.
We use the following lemma to prove the theorem. It states that every formula is equivalent with a formula which
has almost the desired form.
Lemma 3.5 Every test formula is equivalent with a formula of the form (9) where a disjunct
∧
jTij is 1.   0 or
2. of the form  > 0 ∧ ∧j Tij , where
Tij :: Trij | Trij S true | trueS Trij | trueS1 Trij S2 true, with Trij (negated) traces. (11)
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Proof We show the lemma by induction on the structure of test formulae. Throughout the proof we omit the
indices in disjunctive normal forms. For the base case, we show that every formula in F ∈ Form has an equivalent
formula in the required form. Since F is a Boolean combination of traces, it has an equivalent representation in
disjunctive normal form:
∨∧




Tr) ∧ ( >
0 ∨   0)). Distributivity gives ∨(((∧Tr) ∧  > 0) ∨ ((∧Tr) ∧   0)). Since a non-negated trace contains a
phase with > 0, it is not satisfiable on a point interval with   0. Therefore the second term, (∧Tr)∧   0, is
only satisfiable if all Tr are negated traces. But in this case the term is equivalent with   0. This proves the base
case.
For the induction step, we assume that TFl ∈ T est form is equivalent with ∃Sl : ∨∧ Tl , for l  1, 2. Consider
the case TF1 ; TF2. Applying the hypothesis to TF1 gives (∃S1 : ∨∧ T1) ; TF2. Pulling the quantification outside
yields ∃S1 : ((∨∧ T1) ;TF2). The distributivity of chop and disjunction leads to the formula ∃S1 : ∨((∧ T1) ;TF2).
We treat TF2 analogously and get ∃S1 : ∃S2 : ∨∨((∧ T1) ; (∧ T2)).
We now show how to transform the chopped formula (
∧ T1) ; (
∧ T2) into the desired form. There are three
cases. If
∧ T1 is   0, we can equivalently replace the chopped formula by ∧ T2 which is of the desired form by
the induction hypothesis. Analogously in the case when
∧ T2 is   0. In the case both disjuncts are different
from   0, both of them contain  > 0 by construction. This allows the introduction of a sync event. Thus
(
∧ T1) ; (
∧ T2) is equivalent with ∃S : (∧ T1)S (∧ T2). With the distributivity of sync events and conjunction,
we have ∃S : ∧(T1S true) ∧ ∧(trueS T2). The existence of  > 0 in (∧ T2) allows us to replace the formulae
T1 S true by T1 S true. This yields ∃S : ∧(T1 S true) ∧ ∧(trueS T2). Afterwards, we pull outside the
existential quantification.
We now distinguish the cases for T . If T is a trace or negated trace Tr, both TrS true and trueS Tr
are of the form in (11). In the case T  true S ′ Tr, we have that true S ′ Tr S true is of the form in
(11). For trueS trueS ′ Tr we apply the distributivity in Equivalence (8) which gives (trueS trueS ′
true)∧ (trueS ′ Tr). Again we argue that we can equivalently replace true by true. Both formulae, trueS
trueS ′ true and trueS ′ Tr, are of the desired form. The cases TrS true and trueS1 TrS2 true
follow analogously.
In the caseTF1∧TF2, the hypothesis gives (∃S1 : ∨∧ T1)∧(∃S2 : ∨∧ T2).Wepull outside bothquantifications
and use the distributivity of disjunction and conjunction. This equivalently gives ∃S1 : ∃S2 : ∨∨((∧ T1)∧(∧ T2)).
By the hypothesis all Ti are of the form in (11) which proves the case.
In the case TF1 ∨ TF2, we only pull outside the existential quantifiers. This concludes the proof. 
Proof of Theorem 3.4 Consider the test formula TF . It is satisfiability equivalent with TF ; true. We replace TF
with the equivalent formula from Lemma 3.5, i.e., a formula ∃S : ∨∧ T satisfying the requirements. This yields
(∃S : ∨∧ T ) ; true. We pull the quantification outside and use the distributivity of chop and disjunction to
equivalently get ∃S : ∨((∧ T ) ; true). In the case the disjunct is  0, the formula  0 ; true is equivalent
with true ; true which is equivalent with ∃S : true S true via (7). This yields a formula of the form
(10). In the case we have a proper disjunct, a sync event is introduced giving ∃S : (∧ T ) S true. We pull
the existential quantification outside. Via Distributivity (8) the remaining formula is equivalent with
∧
(T S
true) ∧ (trueS true). A sync event implies a length of the first interval greater zero, thus we can remove
the sub-formula true S true. That all T S true can be brought into the form in (10) follows from the
proof of Lemma 3.5. 
The computation of the DNFs and the known distributivities may lead to an exponential blow up of TF . We
tackle this problem by model checking all disjuncts separately. Distributivity (8) neither increases the number of
(negated) traces nor the size of the product automata (cf. restriction, Sect. 4).
To continue the example above, we gain the normal form of formula (5) by introducing two sync events (7)
and using the distributivity of sync events and conjunctions (8):
Warn ; (NoBrake1 ∧ NoBrake2) ; true
⇔ ∃S0 : ∃S1 : (WarnS0 true) ∧
∧
i1,2(trueS0 NoBrakei S1 true).
4. Model checking with test automata
To define whether a PEA model of a system satisfies a test formula, we relate interpretations of observables and
runs of PEA. Given Boolean observables E1, . . . , En and observables X1, . . . ,Xm, an interpretation I is said to fit
to a run r iff
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• the set of events in the PEA is included in the set of Boolean observables {E1, . . . , En}, the set of variables in
the PEA is a subset of the observables {X1, . . . ,Xm},
• the observables used in the PEA are interpreted as imposed by the valuations in the run,
• a change in the interpretation of a Boolean observable Ei occurs at time t iff the PEA changes its state at time
t and the variable is contained in the set of events, i. e., Ei ∈ Y .
Every run of a PEA induces a fitting interpretation. Satisfaction of a formula by a PEA is defined over the
interpretations fitting to the runs of the automaton.
Definition 4.1 A PEA A satisfies a DC formula F , denoted by A |0 F , iff all interpretations I fitting to a run r
satisfy the formula from time zero:
A |0 F :⇔ ∀I : ∀r ∈ Run(A) : (I fits to r ⇒ I |0 F ).
With this notion of satisfaction, we establish the correctness of compositional verification for PEA in
Theorem 4.2: local properties hold for the entire system. More precisely, if a property holds for an automa-
ton A1, then it holds for any composition A1 ‖ A2.
Theorem 4.2 Given PEA A1, A2, and a DC formula F . If A1 |0 F then A1 ‖ A2 |0 F .
Proof The automaton A1 ‖ A2 satisfies F iff every interpretation I that fits to a run r of A1 ‖ A2 satisfies F .
Consider such an interpretation I which fits to the run r. Since r is a run of the composition A1 ‖ A2, it is in
particular a run of A1. Thus, I is an interpretation that fits to a run of A1. Since A1 |0 F , I satisfies F from
zero. 
4.1. Power set construction for traces
To begin with, we sketch a non-compositional construction that builds a deterministic PEA for a trace formula. A
trace tr consists of several consecutive phases. Each phase can have a state expression ϕi , a time restriction denoted
by  ∼ ki , ∼ ∈ {∅,<,≤,≥,>}, and a conjunction of forbidden events  E1 ∧ . . . ∧  En. This set of events is
denoted byFE i  {E1, . . . , En} ⊆ A. Before the i-th phase there can be some event specification, φ(E1) ; . . . ;φ(Em),
where φ(Ej)   Ej or φ(Ej)   Ej . This specification is equivalent with the conjunction φ(E1) ∧ . . . ∧ φ(Em),
which is denoted by Eentry,i . We say that the i-th phase requires an entry event if Eentry,i contains  Ej . The event
specifications after the last phase are exit events of the trace and their conjunction is denoted by Eexit. Thus our






 E ∧ 0 <  ∼ k1
)





 E ∧ 0 <  ∼ kn
)
; Eexit.
It is straightforward to build a nondeterministic PEA by introducing a location for each phase of the trace that
ensures ϕi holds and no forbidden events occur. These locations are connected by transitions that check that
the entry events occur. A location of the automaton is reached in a run if there is an interpretation that fits to
the run and that satisfies the prefix of the trace ending with the corresponding phase. However, to allow the
negation of traces we need to construct a deterministic PEA. The idea is similar to the power set construction of a
deterministic finite automaton from a nondeterministic one. For finite automata the locations of the deterministic
automaton are labelled with the sets of locations which the nondeterministic automaton can reach for a given
word. In our setting, the locations of the nondeterministic automaton correspond to the phases of the trace.
Thus, we label the locations with sets of phases.
With Prefix(tr, i) we denote the prefix of the trace tr ending with the i-th phase. If the trace has a timing
constraint  ∼ ki on the i-th phase, we denote with Prefix≤(tr, i) the prefix where this timing constraint is
replaced with  ≤ ki . Note, that only the last timing constraint is replaced.
To simplify our presentation, we give the construction for traces containing only strict time bounds (<, >).
In [Hoe06] the general construction is given in full detail. The locations P of the deterministic PEA are the sets
in P({1, . . . , n, 1>, . . . , n>}), thus it may grow exponentially in the number of phases in the trace. The basic idea
is to construct a deterministic automaton with the following properties. The location p the automaton visits
at time t in a run contains those phases i of the trace for which the fitting interpretations in the interval [0, t]
satisfy Prefix(tr, i). However, for phases with an upper bound, that bound only has to hold weakly, i. e., they
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satisfy Prefix≤(tr, i). Furthermore, the location contains i> for those phases i that have a lower bound and where
Prefix≤(tr, i) ∧ ¬ Prefix(tr, i) holds, i. e., the minimum duration of phase i has not been reached.We also say that
a phase i is active if the current location p contains either i or i>. A location p of the automaton never contains i
and i> simultaneously.
Particular care is needed for ensuring the length constraints on the phases. Since the time domain is dense,
the automaton cannot remember all possible durations for which a phase may be active. The trick we use in our
construction is to remember only the infimum or the supremum of the possible values. We do this depending
on whether the phase has an upper or a lower bound. For each phase i with an upper bound, there is a clock
ci measuring the infimum of the amount of time that has been spent in the phase i. To be more precise, if the
location p contains the phase i then for every time t when p is visited in a run to which an interpretation I fits
the value of clock ci is
inf
{








However, there is a special case when the infimum is zero. This is explained after the seep formula, below.
For each phase i with a lower bound, there is a clock ci measuring the supremum of the amount of time that has
been spent in this phase: if i> ∈ p, then the value of clock ci is
sup
{








Note, that this supremum is at most ki , since Prefix≤(tr, i) holds.
In Duration Calculus with dense time, the formula ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⇒ (ϕ1 ; ϕ2) holds. So if the latter trace is
given and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 holds, the automaton should not only enter the ϕ1-phase but also the ϕ2-phase. Therefore,
in the construction it is possible to enter two or more adjacent phases simultaneously. This happens if there is no
entry event required for the second phase, there is no lower bound for the first phase, and the phase formulae ϕi
for both phases hold. In this case, we say the automaton seeps through the first phase into the second phase. The
following formula captures this notion and states that in location p seeping into phase i is possible if i − 1 ∈ p
and no entry event is required for phase i:
seep(i, p) 
{
false if i requires an entry event,
i − 1 ∈ p otherwise.
If for some location p and a phase i with an upper bound seep(i, p) (thus i − 1 ∈ p) and i ∈ p hold, then the chop
point between phase i − 1 and phase i can be set to an arbitrarily large time. This means, phase i is visited as late
as possible. Thus the infimum
inf
{







is zero as long as the automaton stays in location p. Therefore, there is no need to use the clock ci in a location
for which seep(i, p) holds.
The following function complete denotes that the automaton has detected that Prefix(tr, i) holds. This can
only be the case if i ∈ p. For a phase with an upper bound  < ki we additionally require that ci < ki or seep(i, p)
holds. In the latter case, the duration of the ith phase can be arbitrarily small.
complete(i, p) ⇔
{
i ∈ p ∧ (seep(i, p) ∨ ci < ki) iff i has an upper bound,
i ∈ p otherwise.
There are three reasons a phase i is active after a transition of the automaton. Either the phase is entered from
the previous phase, or the automaton seeps into the current phase, or the phase was already active and is kept
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active. The following formulae denote the cases where a phase is entered or kept. In the formulae, i denotes the
phase under consideration and p the previous location:
enter(i, p) complete(i − 1, p) ∧ Eentry,i,




These functions serve to define the transitions in the automaton. The transition set consists of tuples (p, g,X , p′)


























(enter(i, p) ∨ seep(i, p′)) ∧ ϕi ∧ ¬ keep(i, p) if i has lower bound,
¬ seep(i, p′) ∧








i ∈ p′ ⇔ keep(i, p) ∧ ϕi ∧ (i ∈ p ∨ ci ≥ ki) if i has lower bound,













The first line states that a phase i is active in the successor location (i ∈ p′ or i> ∈ p′) iff enter, seep, or keep hold
and the state expression ϕi is true. Note that seeping is possible if the previous phase i − 1 is also in the successor
location p′, while for enter and keep the previous location pmatters. The second to fourth lines define the different
cases when a clock is reset. For phases with a lower bound, the clock should contain the supremum, therefore it
is only reset if it is not possible to stay in the phase, i. e., ¬ keep holds. For phases with an upper bound, the clock
should contain the infimum. We argued above that the clock value is ignored if seep(i, p′) holds. Therefore there
is no need to reset the clock in this case. Otherwise, if seep(i, p) holds for the previous location p, the infimum is
zero at the time the transition is taken. Therefore, if the automaton stays in phase i (keep(i, p) holds) the clock
is reset. It is also reset if the phase i is entered, e. g., with an entry event. Finally, for a lower bound phase i, the
automaton is in a location p′ with i ∈ p′ only if the phase is active for at least the duration ki . This is only the case
if it was active before (denoted keep(i, p)) and i ∈ p holds for the previous location, or the clock ci has reached
the bound ki . Note that when evaluating the above formula for a given p, X , and p′, most of the atoms simplify
to true and false, respectively. In many cases the whole formula can be simplified to true or false.
The state invariant makes sure that for all active phases ϕi hold. Furthermore, if a phase i is not active but
seep(i, p) holds, then its state invariant must be violated, because otherwise it would be immediately activated.
The clock invariant makes sure that ci ≤ ki for all phases i ∈ p with an upper bound and all phases i with i> ∈ p.































The initial locations of the automaton are (1) the locations labelled with {1, 2, . . . , i}, where all phases do not
have a lower bound and do not require entry events and (2) the location {1, . . . , i − 1, i>}, where i has a lower
bound, phases 1, . . . , i − 1 have no lower bound, and all phases do not require entry events.
The PEA for the trace
true ; ϕ1 ; 0 <  < k ; ϕ2 (12)
is depicted in Fig. 2 in the rectangular area. The trace formula holds if there is a change from a state satisfying
ϕ1 to a state satisfying ϕ2 in less than k time units. In the context of our case study, this can be a movement of
the train that should not be possible due to its limited speed. In the diagram the locations p with 2 ∈ p, 3 ∈ p are
omitted since their invariant s(p) is false. The locations with 1 ∈ p are also omitted since they are not reachable.
Furthermore, most of the guards are identical to the invariant of the destination location so they are omitted,
too.
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Fig. 2. The test automaton for (true ; ϕ1 ; 0 <  < k ; ϕ2)S true
Lemma 4.3 (Deterministic construction) The automaton produced by the construction sketched above is deter-
ministic, i. e., for a location p, clock valuation γ , event set Y , and state β, there is a unique successor p′ and a
unique clock reset set X , such that for the corresponding transition (p, g,X , p′) the guard formula g holds.
Proof We exploit the shape of the guard formula g. It is a conjunction of biimplications, that define whether
i, i> ∈ p′ and whether ci ∈ X . Care has to be taken since the right-hand-sides of the biimplications contain p′ in
the formula seep(i, p′). However, seep(i, p′) only depends on i − 1 ∈ p′, which can be computed in an earlier step.
Therefore, it is possible to compute p′ and X by starting with i  1 and evaluating the truth values for i ∈ p′,
i> ∈ p′ and i ∈ X . Afterwards this is repeated for i  2 and so on. It is easy to see that the p′ and X computed
this way correspond to the unique transition for which g is true. 
The interpretation satisfies the whole trace tr iff the last phase n is complete and all exit events occur. This is
formalised as
completetr(p) ⇔ complete(n, p) ∧ Eexit. (13)
Note that complete(n, p) is either true, false, or cn < kn.
Lemma 4.4 (Power set construction) For every trace tr there are a deterministic PEA P(tr) and a formula
completetr(p) for every location p in P(tr) such that for each interpretation I fitting to a run 〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0),








⎦ | tr if and only if γk + tk,Yk | completetr(pk).
The proof is given in [Hoe06].
4.2. Test automata
Test automata (TA) are PEA with a distinguished location, called the bad state. The runs of a TA are the runs
of the underlying PEA. A run is said to be a test run iff it reaches the bad state. Reaching the bad state in the
parallel composition of a system with a TA means that the system can exhibit the undesired behaviour specified
in the test formula the TA is constructed for.
We define the TA semantics for the normal form of test formulae. Therefore, we require three operations on
TA: parallel composition to express the conjunction, sequential composition to represent the formula structure
in (10), and restriction to model sync events.
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The parallel composition of test automata, TA1 ‖ TA2, takes the parallel composition of the underlying PEA
and defines the bad state of the composed automaton to be the pair of the bad states in the component automata.
The sequential compositionof two test automata, denoted byTA1•S,γTA2,means the secondTA is startedwhen
the first one has accepted its formula. Since the acceptance of trace formulae may depend on clock valuations, we
cannot use bad states to check the acceptance in the TA for traces. Instead, we use a guard function γ yielding
a first-order formula for every location. Precisely, we define the sequential composition as follows. A transition
between every location p in the first automaton and every initial location p′ in the second automaton is inserted.
The new transition demands S ∧ γ (p), where the event S represents the sync event in (10) and γ (p) holds iff the
test formula represented by the first TA is satisfied. The function γ is given by completetr (respectively¬completetr)
as defined in (13). Furthermore, the transition resets all clocks.
Given a test automaton TA, the restriction of TA to the event S, denoted by TA\{S}, is defined by TA with
the guards of the transitions changed: if the guard does not contain S in TA, the requirement ¬S is added in
TA\{S}, otherwise, the transition remains unchanged. The restriction operator is used to make the occurrences
of sync events unique.
As an example, consider the formula tr S true, where tr is the trace in (12). Figure 2 represents the
corresponding TA:
(P(tr)•S,completetrP(true)
)\{S}. The trace automatonP(tr) is connected with the automaton
P(true), the composed automaton is restricted to the event S. For P(tr) the restriction is only indicated.
Moreover, transitions with guard false are removed.
4.3. A test automata semantics for test formulae
We now define a test automata semantics for test formulae, i.e., a mapping that assigns to each test formula (in
normal form, cf. Theorem 3.4) TF a test automaton P(TF ). The disjunction in the normal form is not lifted to
automata level but model checking is done stepwise for all disjuncts until a satisfied disjunct is found.
Definition 4.5 (Test automata semantics) The test automata semantics for a test formula in normal formTF yields
a PEA P(TF ) defined as follows:
P(tr S true) :
(P(tr)•S,completetrP(true)
)\{S}
P(¬tr S true) :
(P(tr)•S,¬completetrP(true)
)\{S}
P(trueS1 T r S2 true) :
[




i2Ti2 ) : P(
∧
i1Ti1 ) ‖ P(
∧
i2Ti2 ),
where tr is a trace, T r a trace or a negated trace, S,S1,S2 are Boolean observables, and Til are of the form in
Eq. (10).
A test formula is satisfied by an interpretation on an interval iff the bad state in the TA is reachable in a run the
interpretation fits to. This characterisation is essential in the correctness proof of our model checking procedure.
Lemma 4.6 (Characterisation of satisfaction with test automata) Consider the normal form ∃Sijk : ∨i
∧
j Tij of a
test formula. Given an interpretation I and t ∈ R≥0, the following equivalence holds for every disjunct:
I, [0, t] | ∧jTij ⇔ ∃ test run r ∈ Run(P(
∧
jTij)) : I fits to r and r reaches the bad state at time t.
Proof We prove the case tr S true and comment on the other base cases. Let I, [0, t] | tr S true. By
definition there is t′ ∈]0, t[ such that I, [0, t′] | tr and I, [t′, t′] | trueS true and I, [t′, t] | true. According
to Lemma 4.3, P(tr) is deterministic. Thus, the interpretation I induces a run it fits to:
r′ : 〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0) , (p1, β1, γ1, t1,Y1) , . . .〉 ∈ Run(P(tr)).
The closure of runs under stuttering steps allows us to assume the existence of k, kt ∈ N0 with k < kt and
ki0ti  t′, kti0ti  t. We construct a run r of the composed automaton. For all clocks c, the new evaluations
are γˆj(c) : 0, if j  k + 1 and γˆj(c) : γˆj−1 + tj−1, otherwise. The new run is
r : 〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0), . . . , (pk, βk, γk, tk,Yk ∪ {S}), (ptrue, βk+1, γˆk+1, tk+1,Yk+1), . . .〉.
We argue that r ∈ Run(P(tr S true)). With Lemma 4.4 I, [0, t′] | tr implies γk + tk,Yk | completetr (pk).
The sync event S does not occur in the run r′ because it is fresh for P(tr). Therefore, in r the event S occurs
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precisely when the transition is taken from pk to ptrue. This proves r ∈ Run(P(tr S true)). From the fact that
I fits to r′ it follows immediately that I fits to r. We also note that the bad state is reached at time t.
To show the implication from right to left, we assume the existence of a run in Run(P(tr S true)) the
interpretation I fits to and that reaches the bad state ptrue at time t. Let that run be
〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0), . . . , (pk, βk, γk, tk,Yk), (pk+1, βk+1, γk+1, tk+1,Yk+1), . . .〉,
where pk+1 is the first occurrence of ptrue and t  ji0ti , for j > k. The set of runs is prefix closed. Thus,〈(p0, β0, γ0, t0,Y0), . . . , (pk, βk, γk, tk,Yk)〉 is a run of P(tr S true) to which I fits. Since it uses locations and
transitions in P(tr) only, it is a run of P(tr). From the transition from pk to ptrue it follows that γk + tk,Yk |
completetr (pk). Lemma 4.4 implies I, [0, t′] | tr with t′ : ki0ti . By construction, exactly Yk contains S. ThusI, [t′, t′] | trueS true. We conclude that I, [0, t] | tr S true.
The proof for ¬tr S true and true S1 tr S2 true are similar. The case true S1 ¬tr S2 true
contains a subtlety. The formula ¬tr is satisfied by an empty interval. But the proof of Theorem 3.4 ensures that
time elapses between both sync events. It is therefore correct that we do not construct a transition with both sync
events from the initial phase to the bad state.
For the induction step, let
∧
ilTil , l  1, 2, be two conjunctions of formulae in (10). We first prove the
implication from left to right. By definition, I, [0, t] | ∧i1Ti1 ∧
∧
i2Ti2 is equivalent with I, [0, t] |
∧
i1Ti1 andI, [0, t] | ∧i2Ti2 . By the hypothesis, there are automata P(
∧
ilTil ) and test runs
rl :
〈
(p0,l , β0,l , γ0,l , t0,l ,Y0,l ), (p1,l , β1,l , γ1,l , t1,l ,Y1,l ), . . .
〉 ∈ Run(P(∧ilTil )).
Moreover, I fits to rl and there are k, k′ ∈ N>0 with pk,1  pbad,1, pk′,2  pbad,2 and kj0tj,1  t  k′j0tj,2.
We construct r ∈ P(∧i1Ti1 ) ‖ P(
∧
i2Ti2 ) that satisfies the requirements. The sets of runs in PEA are closed under
stuttering. We introduce stuttering steps into r1 and r2 such that the transitions are taken synchronously. This
gives the runs r′1 and r
′
2 to which I fits. We define
r : 〈((p0,1, p0,2), β ′0,1 ∪ β ′0,2, γ ′0,1 ∪ γ ′0,2, t′0,1,Y ′0,1 ∪ Y ′0,2
)
, . . .
〉
.
The union of γ ′ functions is well defined due to the disjointness of the clocks. The union of β ′ functions is well
defined because I fits to both r′l . For the same reason, we have E ∈ Y ′i,1 iff E ∈ Y ′i,2. This shows I fits to r. It is
straightforward to prove that r is a run of P(∧i1Ti1 ) ‖ P(
∧
i2Ti2 ) reaching (pbad,1, pbad,2) at time t.
To show the reverse direction, let there be a run r ∈ Run(P(∧i1Ti1 ) ‖ P(
∧
i2Ti2 )) such that I fits to r and r
reaches the bad state (pbad,1, pbad,2) at moment t. Restricting the run to the variables and events of the component
automata yields runs rl ∈ Run(P(∧ilTil )). Moreover, I fits to rl and the bad states pbad,l are reached at t. The
hypothesis gives I, [0, t] | ∧i1Ti1 and I, [0, t] |
∧




i2Ti2 . This concludes the
proof. 
With Lemma 4.6 we can reduce the problem whether a PEA satisfies a negated test formula to a reachability
question. The correctness of our model checking procedure is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7 (Correctness of model checking) Let TF be a test formula with the normal form ∃Sijk : ∨i
∧
j Tij .
The model checking problem whether the negated test formula is satisfied by a PEA A can be characterised by
reachability as follows:
¬ (A |0 ¬TF ) ⇔ ∃i : ∃r ∈ Run(A ‖ P(∧jTij)) : r reaches a location (p, pbad ),
where p is a location of A and pbad is the bad state of P(
∧
j Tij).
Proof Consider the model checking problem A |0 ¬TF for a PEA A and a test formula TF . To begin with,
we apply the definition of satisfaction for a formula and an automaton, Definition 4.1, and the definition of
satisfaction from time zero, Sect. 2.1. Pulling the negation inwards yields the following equivalences:
¬ (A |0 ¬TF )
⇔¬∀I : ∀r ∈ Run(A) : (I fits to r ⇒ I |0 ¬TF )
⇔¬∀I : ∀r ∈ Run(A) : (I fits to r ⇒ (∀t ∈ R≥0 : I, [0, t] | ¬TF ))
⇔∃I : ∃r ∈ Run(A) : ∃t ∈ R≥0 : I fits to r ∧ I, [0, t] | TF .
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According to Theorem 3.4, the normal form ∃Sijk : ∨i
∧
j Tij is satisfiability equivalent with TF . The set of
observables Sijk can be assumed to be disjoint from the variables and events in A. We replace TF by its normal
form and apply the definition of quantification over observables. This continues the equivalence:
⇔∃I : ∃r ∈ Run(A) : ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : I fits to r ∧ I, [0, t′] | ∃Sijk : ∨i
∧
j Tij





Since Sijk ∩A  ∅, I ′ belongs to a run of A if and only if I does. This allows us to unify the quantifications over
interpretations:
⇔∃I ′ : ∃r ∈ Run(A) : ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : I ′ fits to r ∧ I ′, [0, t′] | ∨i
∧
j Tij
⇔∃I ′ : ∃r ∈ Run(A) : ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : ∃i : I ′ fits to r ∧ I ′, [0, t′] | ∧jTij .
Applying Lemma 4.6 allows us to replace the satisfaction problem for a disjunct by a reachability question for
the corresponding test automaton:
⇔∃I ′ : ∃r ∈ Run(A) : ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : ∃i : I ′ fits to r ∧
∃r′ ∈ Run(P(∧jTij)) : I ′ fits to r′ ∧ r′ reaches the bad state pbad at t′
⇔∃I ′ : ∃i : ∃r′′ ∈ Run(A ‖ P(∧jTij)) : ∃t′ ∈ R≥0 : I ′ fits to r′′ ∧ r′′ reaches a location (p, pbad ) at t′.
The last equivalence is proven in the induction step of Lemma 4.6. In the beginning of this section, we men-
tioned that every run induces an interpretation that fits to it. We therefore remove the quantification over the
interpretation. Analogously, we remove the quantification over the point in time:
⇔∃i : ∃r′′ ∈ Run(A ‖ P(∧jTij)) : r′′ reaches a location (p, pbad ).
This concludes the proof of the equivalence. 
Model checking can be done separately for all disjuncts and terminates as soon as the bad state is reachable
in one of the disjuncts. The parallel composition A ‖ P(∧j Tij) only needs to be computed for the evaluated
disjuncts. A disjunct may consist of several conjuncted formulae. For model checking, a subset of these formulae
may be chosen. Only if the bad state is reachable in the TA for the subset, further formulae have to be added.
Model checking is repeated for the new set of formulae gained by this iterative procedure. If the bad state is not
reachable for the subset, we know that it is not reachable for the whole disjunct. This incremental approximation
can significantly reduce the TA size.
We briefly discuss the decidability of our model checking approach stated in Theorem 4.7. Consider a PEA
A and a test formula TF . To decide A |0 ¬TF , we need to compute the normal form ∃Sijk : ∨i
∧
j Tij of TF , the
test automata P(∧j Tij) of the disjuncts, and the composition A ‖ P(
∧
j Tij). All procedures terminate. We then
need to decide, whether the composition reaches the bad state in the test automaton.
Thus, our model checking problem is decidable if and only if the reachability problem in A ‖ P(∧j Tij) is.
As discussed in Sect. 2.2, the reachability problem is undecidable for general PEA. But, if we have finite data
domains in A and effective predicates (1) on the transitions of A and (2) in TF then the reachability problem is
decidable, even in the presence of parameters. We translate A ‖ P(∧j Tij) into a timed automaton as explained in
Sect. 2.2 and check reachability with the procedure in [AD94] or using more efficient implementations [UPP05].
Unfortunately, in our case study (cf. Sect. 5) we do not have finite data domains. Moreover, unfolding the states
to all evaluations of state variables results in an exponential blow up of the state space. We discuss how we handle
these problems in the following section.
4.4. Tool support
We implemented the graphical design toolMoby/PEA [HMF06] to develop PEAmodels. For complex scenarios,
we use the high-level language CSP-OZ-DC [Hoe06] to create system models (cf. Sect. 5), which we then compile
to PEA. Afterwards we check whether the PEA satisfies a given test formula. The verification process is outlined
in Fig. 3.
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Fig. 3. Flow of the verification process
For transforming the test formula into a set of test automata, applying the algorithms of Sect. 3 and 4, we
implemented a compiler [HMF06] that automatically computes the normal form and the corresponding test
automata. In the next step, we compute the parallel composition of the test automata and the PEA of the model.
Our tool generates outputs for the model checking tools Uppaal [UPP05] and ARMC [Ryb07, PR07]. Finally,
we apply a model checker on the product automaton.
Our case study requires that the applied model checker is able to handle infinite numeric data domains and
parameters. Unfortunately, for this class of inputs the model checker Uppaal is of limited use, because it does not
meet this requirement. We use the model checker ARMC, which can analyse reachability properties of infinite
state systems. Compared to other state-of-the-art model checkers, e.g., Blast [HJMM04] and SLAM [BMMR01],
ARMC particularly suites the case study due to its specialised abstraction discovery algorithms for unbounded
numeric data domains [RSS07].
We briefly sketch the abstract reachability algorithm implemented in ARMC, and refer to [PR07] for a
detailed account. The input to ARMC is a control-flow graph whose edges are annotated by transition relations
expressed as linear arithmetic constraints together with the specification of the initial and error location. ARMC
automatically constructs a safe abstraction (i.e., an over-approximation) of the set of reachable states of the input
PEA bymeans of predicate abstraction [GS97]. The abstraction is incrementally refined until the error location is
not contained in the over-approximation or a counterexample connecting the initial and error locations is found.
The building blocks for computing the abstraction are predicates over PEA variables, events, and clocks. We
use abstraction induced by a fixed finite set of predicates to ensure convergence of the reachability computation.
Given such a set, the abstraction of a set of PEA states is the conjunction of all predicates that subsume the
given set of states. The abstraction of the set of reachable states is computed iteratively, by interleaving symbolic
unrolling of the PEA’s transition relation, which computes a set of reachable states with its abstraction using
predicates.
In this process, the right choice of predicates is crucial, since the resulting over-approximation needs to be
sufficiently precise in order to prove the non-reachability of the error locations. The process of choosing the
right abstraction is guided by spurious counterexamples that are found if the abstraction is not precise enough
to verify the property [CGJ+00]. We apply the recent methodology for the extraction of new predicates from
spurious counterexamples that is based on interpolation [McM03, HJMM04]. We designed and implemented
an efficient algorithm for the computation of interpolants for arbitrary linear inequalities over rationals/reals
[RSS07]. The existing implementations only support restricted classes of inequalities over at most two variables
and do not handle strict inequalities, which are particularly needed for the verification of real-time systems.
Our algorithm applies constraint solving techniques to compute interpolants. It is implemented using Linear
Programming solvers in a black-box fashion, providing a basis for an efficient implementation.
5. Case study
In this section, we take up the case study from Sect. 1.1 to show the practicability of our approach in a realistic
scenario. We pass from a declarative high-level description of our case study to a PEA representation for which
we verify safety properties.
5.1. Case study scenario: emergency procedure in the ETCS
As introduced in Sect. 1.1, our goal is to model and analyse the treatment of emergencymessages in the European
Train Control System that is informally specified in [ERT02, ECS99]. Therefore, we consider two consecutive
trains on a (to simplify matters) infinite track segment (cf. Fig. 1), defined by train positions: Position : R. The
trains measure their positions periodically and adjust their speed between a lower bound TargetSpeed and an
upper bound MaxSpeed , such that the follower is always able to brake safely applying the service brakes. To this
end, the service brake intervention limit (SBI) is calculated periodically: the last position the train has to apply
the service brakes such that it remains possible to stop safely. If the first train detects an emergency it sends an
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alert to the RBC which forwards this message within 5 time units. If necessary the follower immediately brakes.
Otherwise, the emergency is indicated to the driver (within 1.5 time units) who has to acknowledge the warning
(i.e., the driver takes responsibility for driving and the system is assumed to be safe) or to apply the emergency
brakes. If the driver does not react the emergency brakes are applied automatically by the ETCS on-board unit
within 5 time units. We use our verification technique to verify collision freedom of the trains.
5.2. Case study specification
To facilitate the verification of complex and heterogenous systems like the ETCS case study, one has to consider
different aspects. That is, we have to cope with several communicating components (the trains and the RBC) with
a complex control structure (driver reaction to incoming emergency warnings) and thus, with a large discrete
state space. In addition, the state space becomes infinite due to infinite data types and a continuous time model.
Moreover, the case study requires the transfer ofmessages including data values from infinite domains (real-valued
train positions). Finally, since the case study is parametric, i.e., no explicit values are given for some constants,
the system has to be verified in the presence of parameters with an infinite range.
To cope with the discussed aspects, we use the high-level language CSP-OZ-DC [HO02] as specification
formalism. It integrates the well-investigated languages CSP [Hoa85] for specifying communication aspects and
control flow,Object-Z [Smi00] for specifying data changes over infinite data types and parameters, andDC [ZH04]
for the real-time dimension. CSP-OZ-DC is a declarative and object-oriented language with an operational
semantics [Hoe06] in terms of PEA. Hence, we can apply the verification methodology introduced in this paper.
Our case study incorporates five components (Fig. 4) that canbemodelled inCSP-OZ-DCwith the application
domain classes:Train,RBC,Track,Driver, and a communication layerComNetwork, which is necessary tomodel
the transfer times of messages between trains and the RBC. To simplify the verification we differentiate between
the first and the second train on the track and consider two classes FrontTrain and RearTrain. We explain the
class RearTrain in more detail here—the entire specification can be found in Appendix A. Figure 4 also shows
connections between the classes. Messages are transferred between trains and the RBC via channels send and
receive. A train’s position is updated periodically via updatePosition. Additionally, there are channels to indicate
an emergency situation to the driver and channels for acknowledgements and braking instructions from the
driver.
The first part of a CSP-OZ-DC class is the interface declaring channels that are visible outside the class and
local channels for class-internal use. The interface of RearTrain is defined by
RearTrain(ID : TrainID; StartPosition : Position)
chan send : [m! : Message, id : {ID}]
chan receive : [m? : Message, id : {ID}]
chan updatePosition : [id : {ID},pos! : Position]
chan indication
chan getLOA : [id : {ID}, loa? : Position]
chan driverAck, driverEB : [id : {ID}]
local chan computeSBI : [loa?,sbi! : Position]
local chan applySB, releaseSB
local chan getPosition : [pos! : Position]
local chan getSBI : [sbi! : Position]
local chan selectSpeed
local chan applyEB
The first line contains, besides the class name RearTrain, two formal parameters for the ID of the train and
the initial position. Then, the class RearTrain defines channels that can be used for inter-class (e.g., send and
receive) and internal communication. For example, there are local channels applySB and releaseSB for applying
and releasing the train’s service brakes. Channels may have parameters. The parameter m of send is of type
Message :: Alert | Warning | Ack. The message Alert represents an emergency alert that is sent to the RBC.
TheRBCnotifies the second train usingWarning andwaits for an acknowledgementAck. Note that CSP-OZ-DC
admits the transfer of infinite data types, e.g., real-valued train positions as parameter of updatePosition.
The events induced by these channel declarations are structured by CSP processes [Hoa85] in the CSP part
of the class.
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Fig. 4. Objects of the case study scenario
main
c Running ‖|HandleEM
Running c updatePosition.ID?pos → getLOA.ID?loa → computeSBI !loa?sbi →
if sbi ≤ pos
then applySB → selectSpeed → Running
else releaseSB → selectSpeed → Running
HandleEM c receive.Warning.ID → send .Ack.ID → getPosition?pos → getSBI?sbi →
if pos < sbi − OffsetDistance
then indication.ID → (driverAck.ID → DriverResponsible
 EmergencyStop
 driverEB.ID → EmergencyStop)
else EmergencyStop
The execution of the CSP part starts with the main process. The main process of RearTrain consists of an
interleaving of the two subprocesses Running and HandleEM. The former represents the normal behaviour of a
train, the latter the emergency procedure. The subprocess Running states that every updatePosition is followed by
a getLOA event that gets the new limit of authority (LOA), a movement authorisation up to a given position. The
next permitted event is computeSBI that takes the new LOA and computes the SBI position sbi (cf. Sect. 5.1) that
is needed in the if statement. If the current position of the train is already beyond sbi the train has to brake down
to TargetSpeed—the speed the train is allowed to run in the vicinity of the LOA. Otherwise, the train releases the
brakes and selects a new speed value up to MaxSpeed.
The periodicity of updatePosition and computeSBI that is required by the informal case study description is
realised by imposing time constraints to updatePosition in the DC part of the specification. Since there is always
either an applyEB or a releaseSB event between two updatePosition events, the periodicity of updatePosition
likewise guarantees an upper time bound on the occurrence of the brake event applySB.
When the RBC sends a warning, the train receives this message on the channel receive with the process
HandleEM . The process uses the information about the train position and the SBI to decide if it is necessary to
apply the emergency brakes immediately. The constant OffsetDistance represents a reaction distance originating
from the periodic position updates.
In CSP-OZ-DC, data aspects are specified with Object-Z (OZ) [Smi00]. The OZ part consists of schemas
describing the state space and data changes of a class.
currentPosition, currentSpeed : Position




TargetSpeed < currentSpeed ≤ MaxSpeed
currentPosition  StartPosition
The OZ part of RearTrain includes a state schema defining the attributes of the class, e.g., the current position of
the train (currentPosition of the real-valued type Position), the current braking mode (of type BrakingMode ::
None | ServiceBrake | EmergencyBrake), or the position (standstillEB) that will be reached by the train if
applying the emergency brakes. To simplify the treatment of units, we measure speed in terms of PositionupdateBound ,
where updateBound is the time between two position updates. The Init schema constrains the initial state of a
CSP-OZ-DC class. Here, the train is initially not braking, the speed is between TargetSpeed and MaxSpeed, and
the current position is set to StartPosition. We stress that the constants TargetSpeed and MaxSpeed, as well as
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Length, TargetSpeedDistance, OffsetDistance, and StopDistance are parameters, i.e., we do not need to interpret
all constants. Instead, it suffices to specify conditions that restrict the values adequately, e.g., the parameterLength
is constrained by Length > 0.
Operation schemas define state changes that are performed at the same time when—in agreement with the
CSP part of the class—the appropriate events occur. For instance, we associate with the event updatePosition
(from the CSP part) the operation schema com updatePosition.
com selectSpeed
(currentSpeed)
if brakingMode  None then
TargetSpeed < currentSpeed ′ ≤ MaxSpeed
if brakingMode  ServiceBrake then
currentSpeed ′  TargetSpeed
if brakingMode  EmergencyBrake then
(currentSpeed ′ < TargetSpeed ∧
currentPosition + currentSpeed ′ ≤ standstillEB)
∨ (currentSpeed ′  0 ∧







The  expression indicates the state variables changed by an operation schema: in com updatePosition, the new
currentPosition is constrained by currentPosition′  currentPosition + currentSpeed , where the primed variable
refers the new value of the variable (analogous to the definition of PEA in Sect. 2.2). Output variables of operation
schemas like pos! are indicated by !, input variables by ?. The idea for constraining com selectSpeed is as follows.
If the train is not braking it selects a new speed value between TargetSpeed and MaxSpeed . If the service brakes
are applied the new speed is set to TargetSpeed , and if the emergency brakes are applied the speed is set to a
value below TargetSpeed . In the latter case, we take the standstillEB position into account, which is computed in
com applyEB. Furthermore, there are operation schemas (cf. Appendix A) for applying and releasing the service
brakes (com applySB and com releaseSB), for selecting a new speed value (com selectSpeed), and for applying
the emergency brakes (com applyEB).
Finally, in our case study scenario we have real-time constraints on the trains: positions have to be updated
periodically and in case of an emergency the train controller has to react in time. Real-time constraints are
described using counterexample-trace formulae, i.e., negated trace formulae according to Sect. 3:
¬(true ;  updatePosition ; updateBound >  ;  updatePosition)
¬(true ; ( updatePosition.ID ∧ updateBound < ))
¬(true ;  receive.Warning.ID ; ( applyEB ∧  indication ∧ 0.5 < ) ; ( indication ∧ 1 < ))
¬(true ;  indication ; ( driverAck ∧  applyEB ∧ 5 < ))
The first two DC formulae define that updatePosition is a periodic event occurring every updateBound time units.
The thirdDCformulademands that after receivingan emergencywarning the emergencybrakes are appliedwithin
0.5 time units or the emergency is indicated to the driver within 1.5 time units. The driver has to acknowledge the
indication or the emergency brakes are automatically applied within 5 time units, which is required by the last
formula.
Remaining components. The components LeadingTrain, RBC, Driver, ComNetwork, and Track are simpler than
the RearTrain class and we only summarise the ideas behind their specifications. The classes can be found in the
appendix.
LeadingTrain. This is a simplified version of the RearTrain class. The CSP part only considers the running
behaviour as well as the detection of emergencies. If an emergency is detected we assume the worst case, i.e.,
the train stops immediately.
ComNetwork. The communication layer receives and forwards messages between trains and the RBC.
RBC. TheRBC receives emergency alerts from the first train and forwards a warning to the follower. In addition,
a timing constraint demands that the warning will not be delayed.
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Driver. After an emergency indication the driver chooses to acknowledge the indication or to apply the emergency
brakes.
Track. The track represents the environment in our case study scenario. It periodically receives position updates
from the trains and calculates a new LOA if requested (getLOA) by the RearTrain. Additionally, the Track
class guarantees that the train positions are initially safe, i.e., the StartPosition and StartSBI variables are
constrained in the Init schema such that no collision occurs.
Safety property. The desired safety property in our case study is that the trains will never collide if the driver has
not taken the responsibility for driving. In the latter case, the system is assumed to be safe. For a setting with two
trains, this can be expressed by the test formula
¬ (( > 0 ∧  driverAck) ; RearTrain.currentPosition > LeadingTrain.currentPosition − Length). (14)
Here, driverAck, RearTrain.currentPosition, and LeadingTrain.currentPosition are observables, i.e., their values
change during system evolution. Length is the parameter from the case study, the value remains fixed.
Translation into PEA. The translation of CSP-OZ-DC specifications into PEA is compositional: every part of
the specification is translated separately; the semantics of the entire specification is the parallel composition of
the automata for every part: A(CSP-OZ-DC)  A(CSP) ‖ A(OZ) ‖ A(DC).
The PEA for the CSP part directly represents the structured operational semantics of CSP [Ros98] (with
additional stuttering transitions at every location). The OZ part is translated into a PEA with two locations: one
for setting the initial values of the state variables and one for calling operations while the system runs. The latter
has the constraint of the state schema as invariant. It has one transition for every communication schema of the
OZ part. The guard of this transition is given by the constraint defined in the corresponding communication
schema. Finally, each formula of the DC part is translated into a deterministic PEA according to the power set
construction in Sect. 4.1. From this automaton the locations p with completetr(p)  false are removed to ensure
that the system behaviour satisfies the negated trace formula.
5.3. Results
As explained in the previous section, our case study incorporates different dimensions of complex control flow,
communications, real-time aspects, and parameters. Due to this complexity, the translation of the case study
model into PEA results in 18 parallel components, 10 state variables, 15 parameters of channels, and 9 clocks.
Note that the state space is infinite because of infinite ranges of variables and real-time constraints. Hence, this
model is too large to verify the global safety property (14) in a single step. Therefore, we decompose it manually
into smaller parts and verify local properties for the parallel components. These local properties always depend
on less components of the case study model and, by this, they can be verified faster. That the local properties
hold for the entire system is guaranteed by Theorem 4.2. We identify the following local properties:
1. Without emergency detection there is always a (safe) minimal distance between the trains.
2. After an emergency detection the follower starts braking within 8 time units.
3. Starting with the minimal distance of 1., the train still has a distance of StopDistance to the next danger point
after 8 time units.
4. If the train applies the emergency brakes with a distance of StopDistance to the next danger point, it always
stops before reaching the danger point.
Currently, one has to establish manually that the local properties imply the global property, e.g., by using tradi-
tional proof rules for the DC. It is ongoing work to support this step by automated methods. In the following,
we illustrate how these local properties can be defined and verified using our technique.
1. Minimal distance without emergency. This characteristic can be specified by
¬(( > 0 ∧  tf receiveFromTrain alert);
Track.position1 > Track.position0 − Length − TargetSpeedDistance − StopDistance). (15)
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Table 1. Experimental results (Athlon XP 2200+, 512 MB RAM)
Task 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Property (15) 10 482 27 7 6 5 4 s 14 s
Property (16) 34 193 27 3 47 3 3 s 4 s
Property (17) 4.9 T 99T 47 14 3.4T 14 5m 216m
Property (18) 53 3.3 T 34 2 13 2 15 s 22 s
Property (19) 34 1.5 T 33 20 66 18 8 s 2m
Property (20) 52 6.8 T 33 33 108 23 29s 19m
T thousand units, m minutes, s seconds
1 Program locations, 2 transitions, 3 variables, 4 predicates generated by ARMC, 5 abstract states, 6 refinements loops performed by ARMC,
7 runtime for generating test automata and parallel product, 8 runtime for model checking
The tf receiveFromTrain alert is an auxiliary event representing receiveFromTrain’s occurrence with the train
ID 1 and the message Alert as parameters. Like collision freedom this property depends on almost the entire
model. For this reason, we first have to prove further sub-properties, e.g., that the second train updates its position
correctly depending on the current SBI, or that without emergency the first train’s speed is always greater than
TargetSpeed . The latter is specified by the negated test formula
¬(( > 0 ∧  detectEmergency) ∧ (true ; LeadingTrain.currentSpeed < TargetSpeed ; true)). (16)
According to Theorem 4.2, it suffices to take those PEA into account that influence property (16), i.e., in this
case the PEA for the CSP and the OZ part of LeadingTrain. Using our verification method, this property can
be established efficiently (cf. Property (16) in Table 1). Finally, we can show that property (15) holds under the
assumption that those sub-properties are valid. The performance results for this verification task are listed as
Property (15) in Table 1.
2. Braking initialised within 8 time units. The second property we want to verify is that the timing behaviour of
our case study model is correct, i.e.,
¬(true ;  tf receiveFromTrain alert ; ( driverAck ∧  applyEB ∧ 8 < )). (17)
This formula states that after an tf receiveFromTrain alert event the driver has to acknowledge the indication of
the emergency or the emergency brakes have to be applied. To verify the formula we need to consider the PEA
influencing the timing behaviour (again with Theorem 4.2 we get the correctness for the entire specification).
3. Minimal distance after 8 time units. We also have to show that the train moves in 8 time units a distance that
is less than TargetSpeedDistance:
¬(true ; Track.position1 ≤ x ; 0 <  < 8 ; Track.position1 ≥ x + TargetSpeedDistance). (18)
4. Standstill before danger point. Finally, we have to show that if the train applies its emergency brakes with a
distance of StopDistance to the danger point then it will stop before reaching the preceding train. In a first step,
we show that the train will not exceed its standstillEB position:
¬(true ;  applyEB ; true ; RearTrain.currentPosition > RearTrain.standstillEB). (19)
In a second step, we have to show that the standstillEB position is safe, i.e., it is never beyond the current position
of the front train when the rear train brakes with a distance to the preceding train greater than StopDistance:
¬(true ; RearTrain.currentPosition < LeadingTrain.currentPosition − Length − StopDistance;
 applyEB ; RearTrain.standstillEB ≥ LeadingTrain.currentPosition − Length). (20)
Table 1 shows our experimental results for the verification tasks. Columns (1)–(3) contain information about the
size of the model part for the corresponding verification task, columns (4)–(6) contain data about the run of
the model checker. The last two columns contain the run times for the generation of test automata and parallel
product, and for the model checking. Particularly, the table illustrates that we can handle large-scale models with
up to 99,000 program transitions and up to 47 variables (with infinite data types) in an order of 216minutes.
Hence, these results demonstrate that themodel checking algorithmpresented in this paper can deal with complex
problems in large applications of realistic size.
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6. Related and future work
Our class of test formulae is a proper generalisation of previously known classes. It is based on the class of
counterexample-trace formulae [Hoe06] that correspond to negated traces. Counterexample-traces cover the
class of DC implementables [Rav94, Hoe06]. Non-negated traces with phases of exact length, i.e.,   k bound,
are covered by Testform. With this observation our class forms a proper superset of {ϕ,  < k,   k,  > k}-
formulae that have exactly one outermost negation [Fra¨04]. We conjecture that the classes of constraint diagrams
used for model checking timed automata in [DL02] form proper subsets of Testform. We have not yet compared
the expressiveness of our class with the results in [ABBL03].
In [FH07] a positive subclass of DC containing the integral operator, denoted by DCub, is translated into
Linearly Multi-Priced Timed Automata. The translation is fully compositional, i.e., for every DC operator there
is a corresponding operator on the automata. The construction yields a decision algorithm for model checking
timed automata against negated DCub formulae. The classes DCub and Testform are incomparable. We deal with
negated traces but do not handle accumulated durations, while DCub forbids the use of negation.
For positive Duration Interval Logic formulae (DIL+ formulae) a translation into Integration Automata (IA)
is given in [BLR95]. DIL+ formulae are covered by Testform, because they correspond to traces that contain
phases of exact length. To give IA semantics to negated formulae, the authors of [BLR95] show that the negation
of a strongly overlap free DIL+ formula has a congruent DIL+ formula. Since our translation for negated traces
does not require overlap freeness, it covers a strictly larger class of negated formulae.
Pandyaproves the decidability of IntervalDurationLogicwith located constraints (LIDL–) by translation into
event recording timedautomata [Pan02]. Located constraints require disjoint phases, a conditionour construction
does not impose. In contrast, LIDL– is closed under negation even for phases with exact length.
The idea of sync events is closely related to the theory of nominals. In a DC extended with nominals [Han06],
intervals are identified uniquely by names. Similarly, sync events identify chop points. In [KP05] phases in the
QDDC are equipped with fresh observables to identify chop points. This yields decomposition results similar to
ours. The benefit of our work is the integration of sync events with the operators of DC.
Our case study complements the work of [FJSS07] as it incorporates a more complex control structure. The
case study in [FJSS07] considers only a single class but an arbitrary number of trains. Related work on ETCS case
studies like [ZH05, HJU05] focuses on the stochastic examination of the communication reliability and models
components like the train and the RBC in an abstract way without considering data aspects. A hybrid view on
speed control in the ETCS is presented in [Pla07].
We currently develop an algorithm for the verification of DC liveness properties. We follow the automata-
theoretic approach to temporal verification [Var91], which requires checking (fair) termination of the system
composed with the test automaton. Recent advances in automated liveness checking using abstraction refinement
[CPR05, PR05] can provide the necessary model checking support.
Our test formulae admit free function symbols in state expressions, but they are not supported by the
underlying reachability checker. We currently extend the abstraction refinement procedure of ARMC to support
the combined theory of linear arithmetic and free function symbols, following the constraint-based algorithm
[RSS07]. This will allow one to verify more realistic models, where the RBC keeps a list of trains that are currently
on its track segment.
In addition, enhancing our decomposition techniques for properties is ongoing work. They allow for compo-
sitional verification of inherently parallel systems like the ETCS. A prerequisite for compositional verification is
the identification of those system parts necessary to prove the property. Slicing techniques [Bru¨07] may lead to
solutions to this problem.
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Appendix A: CSP-OZ-DC model of the train case study
RearTrain(ID : TrainID; StartPosition,StartSBI : Position)
chan send : [m! : Message, id : {ID}]
chan receive : [m? : Message, id : {ID}]
chan updatePosition : [id : {ID},pos! : Position]
chan indication
chan getLOA : [id : {ID}, loa? : Position]
chan driverAck, driverEB : [id : {ID}]
local chan computeSBI : [loa?,sbi! : Position]
local chan applySB, releaseSB
local chan getPosition : [pos! : Position]





Running c updatePosition.ID?pos → getLOA.ID?loa → computeSBI !loa?sbi →
if sbi ≤ pos
then applySB → selectSpeed → Running
else releaseSB → selectSpeed → Running
HandleEM c receive.Warning.ID → send .Ack.ID → getPosition?pos → getSBI?sbi →
if pos < sbi − OffsetDistance
then indication.ID → (driverAck.ID → DriverResponsible
 EmergencyStop
 driverEB.ID → EmergencyStop)
else EmergencyStop



























if brakingMode  None then
TargetSpeed < currentSpeed ′ ≤ MaxSpeed
if brakingMode  ServiceBrake then
currentSpeed ′  TargetSpeed
if brakingMode  EmergencyBrake then
currentSpeed ′ < TargetSpeed ∧
currentPosition + currentSpeed ′ ≤ standstillEB
∨
currentSpeed ′  0 ∧




if brakingMode  EmergencyBrake then
standstillEB′  standstillEB
else
if currentSpeed  TargetSpeed then











loa?, sbi! : Position









¬(true ;  updatePosition ; updateBound >  ;  updatePosition)
¬(true ; ( updatePosition.ID ∧ updateBound < ))
¬(true ;  receive.Warning.ID ; ( applyEB ∧  indication ∧ 0.5 < ) ; ( indication ∧ 1 < ))
¬(true ;  indication ; ( driverAck ∧  applyEB ∧ 5 < ))
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LeadingTrain(ID : TrainID;
StartPosition : Position)
chansend : [m! : Message, id : {ID}]
chanreceive : [m? : Message, id : {ID}]





























if brakingMode  None then
TargetSpeed ≤ currentSpeed ′(≤ MaxSpeed)
else
currentSpeed ′  0
¬(true ;  updatePosition ; updateBound > 
; updatePosition)
¬(true ; ( updatePosition.ID
∧ updateBound < ))
RBC
chansend : [m! : Message, id ! : TrainID]
chanreceive : [m? : Message, id? : TrainID]
main
c Idle
Idle c receive.Alert → HandleEM
HandleEM c send .Warning!id
→ receive.Ack.id → Idle
¬(true ;  receive.Alert ; ( send .Warning ∧ 0.5 < ))
Driver(ID : TrainID)
chanindication : [id : {ID}]
chandriverAck, driverEB : [id : {ID}]
main
c indication.ID → HandleEM
HandleEM c main
 driverAck.ID → main
 driverEB.ID → main
ComNetwork
chan sendToTrain, sendToRBC
: [m? : Message, id? : TrainID]
chan receiveFromTrain, receiveFromRBC
: [m! : Message, id ! : TrainID]
main
c receiveFromTrain?m.id
→ sendToRBC.m.id → main
 receiveFromRBC?m?id
→ sendToTrain.m.id → main
¬(true ;  receiveFromTrain.id ;
( sendToRBC.id ∧ 0.5 < ))
¬(true ;  receiveFromRBC.id ;
( sendToTrain.id ∧ 0.5 < ))
Track(StartPosition0,StartPosition1,
StartSBI1 : Position)
chanupdatePosition : [id? : TrainID,
pos? : Position]














if id?  0 then
position′0  pos? ∧ position′1  position1
else
position′1  pos? ∧ position′0  position0
com getLOA
loa! : Position
loa!  position0 − Length
Length,TargetSpeed,MaxSpeed,OffsetDistance,
TargetSpeedDistance,StopDistance : Position
0 < Length ∧ 0 < TargetSpeed < MaxSpeed ∧
0 < OffsetDistance
0 < StopDistance < TargetSpeedDistance
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For abbreviated synchronisation alphabets and class instatiations
A  updatePosition, getLOA LT  LeadingTrain(0,StartPosition0)
B  [send → receiveFromTrain, receive → sendToTrain] RT  RearTrain(1,StartPosition1) ‖
D
Driver(1)
C  [receiveFromRBC → send, sendToRBC → receive] Track  Track(StartPosition0,StartPosition1,StartSBI1)
D  driverAck, driverEB, indication Trains  LT ‖|RT








Note that for synchronisation with the ComNetwork (communication alphabets B and C) the linked parallel operator [Ros98] is used. This is, instead of directly
synchronising on the channels send and receive between the trains and the RBC, we map send and receive to receiveFromTrain and sendToTrain.
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